A few months ago the ECB suggested a rate hike in the fall of 2019. It will finally be a rate cut in September. What is the forecast capacity of the ECB? Very weak, however the entire financial system is bent on the choices made by central banks.
This is what is worrying.
The ECB will cut interest rates in September with probably a differentiated deposit rate regime depending on the amount of deposits. It is considering the resumption of asset purchases.
The analysis I was doing this morning always seems correct to me (see here).
I will add another remark nonetheless. The risk of recession appears low according to Draghi. What will the ECB do in the event of a recession? It will be necessary at all costs a proactive fiscal policy to get out. That’s a risky bet
Mario Draghi will most likely announce, for September, measures for a more accommodating monetary policy. A possible rate cut and the resumption of QE would lead to an increase in financial repression. Debt issuers will benefit to the detriment of the savers. This will give additional margins to euro area governments since they will be even less constrained by any financial element.
1- Will household behavior be affected? The drain on their savings will only be gradual via the decline in bond yields (I am thinking here of life insurance for example). Do not count on an acceleration of consumption. This has already occurred when the refi rate has fallen to 0%.
2- The rate on corporate bonds will remain very low especially if the QE includes purchases of companies’ securities. The risk is to have more fragile financial structures because the debt will not stop.
3- The financial repression favors governments which appropriates an additional part of the savings. The question is: what for? If it is to finance operating expenses then the efficiency will be zero and the monetary measure will only increase the discomfort. This means that expenditures must be on capital expenditures to expect the convergence to a higher growth trajectory. In this case, monetary policy will have been effective. This brings back Olivier Blanchard and Martin Uribe’s discussions.
4- These questions bring us once again to fiscal policy and its effectiveness. Draghi discusses this issue at each press conference. Eurozone fiscal policy will not exist for lack of support and not just from Germans.
This means that to be effective the measures announced by the ECB will have to reflect a strong fiscal awareness of all the countries in the zone. One can be dubious unless Germany enters a recession. In this case the purse strings would relax.
We may be wrong about the #BCE. We would like it to be active and reactive while it is posed and a little languid. Maybe this is on purpose to be a pole of stability in a crazy world and not add to the ambient craziness!!!
Mario Draghi said the ECB was ready to act if necessary.
But there is something I don’t understand: the ECB revised down its forecasts for growth and for inflation for this year and the 2 years to come. Growth will barely converge to 1.4% in 2021 and the inflation rate is expected to be at 1.6% for the same year(way below the ECB target).
Can it be satysfying ? No, this level of forecasts are too low.
This means that the Euro Area has not been able to cushion the external negative shock. If there is still leeway on monetary policy side this means that the current stance is too tight. Today’s forward guidance on future monetary policy measures is not sufficient to reverse the trend. Need more
What do I expect as being important next week: 7 points at least
Markit and ISM indices in the manufacturing sector (June 3)
German Industrial Orders for April (June 6)
US employment for May (June 7)
Euro Area inflation rate for May (June 4)
ECB meeting (June 6)
Trade war (no specific date)
Inversion of the US yield curve
The document is available here What to expect Next Week June 3 – June 7 2019
This short document (2 pages) is a synthesis of my macroeconomic views. One page of explanation and one page of graphs – The 2 pages Macro – 15 March 2019