This post is available in pdf format My Wedenesday Column – November 7
US job growth is buoyant, but is it all down to the Trump effect?
The US economy created 250,000 jobs in October, which is a bit higher than the average of 213,000 witnessed since the start of the year. However, October is usually a fairly good month for new job creation, with 271,000 in October 2017, and an average of 246,000 in the month of October since 2013 as compared to an average of 206,000 for other months.
The labor market is buoyant overall, reflecting a solid pace of economic growth although nothing to write home about with 2.25% per year on average since 2011. Continue reading
This post is available in pdf format My Tuesday Column – 9 October 2018
Jair Bolsonaro has come out in the lead in the Brazilian presidential elections with 46%. Looking beyond his very divisive views on certain issues in Brazilian society (status for women, LGBT), on the Paris Agreement and the corruption of previous governments, along with his aim to end Brazil’s endemic violence by allowing Brazilians to take up arms, are there any economic foundations for his likely victory? (see here the Brazilian context of these elections)
This victory has very clear economic explanations. The Brazilian economy has been suffering since 2014 and the collapse in commodities prices. The recession over 2014-2015 and 2016 lasted a very long time, and was followed by a lackluster recovery, which was more of a stabilization than a real rebound. GDP in the second quarter of 2018 still fell 6% short of the 1Q 2014 figure.
This drastic situation can be attributed to two factors. The first is the country’s high dependency on commodities. Brazil enjoyed a very comfortable situation at the start of the current decade when China became its primary trading partner. Opportunities increased and commodities prices soared, so revenues were buoyant and did not encourage investment, creating a phenomenon known as Dutch disease, whereby commodities revenues were such that there was no incentive to invest in alternative businesses. But when Chinese growth began to slow and commodities prices took a nosedive, the Brazilian economy was unable to adapt, so it seized up and plunged into a severe recession.
The other factor is that Brazil devoted hefty financial resources to financing the football World Cup in 2014 and then the Olympic Games in 2016, so in a country with a massive current account deficit, this put a lot of pressure on financing. Funding for public infrastructure replaced investment in production, thereby making the country’s Dutch disease even worse.
The Brazilian population has paid a high price for the country’s brief moment of glory. Continue reading
Here is the frightening part of the Italian budget: growth figures. In an interview Giovanni Tria said that growth forecasts for 2019 and 2020 were 1.6% and 1.7% respectively.
These are unbelievable expectations. Such numbers were attained only in period of global euphoria (2006) or of global recovery (2010). This will not be the case in 2019 or 2020. The Italian GDP growth trend is just 1.1%. That’s why budget numbers are at risks.
We cannot bet on a 2.4% budget deficit in 2019, 2020 and 2021. We must have lower growth figures in mind and probably higher expenditures. The situation is at risk in Italy In other words, the reduction of the public debt (reduction of the public debt to GDP ratio by 1% every year ) will not be achieved.
This post is available in pdf format My weekly Column – Italy Standpoint – PW
What were last week’s major changes?
The main change was in Italy with a strong and rapid drop in the interest spread with Germany.
Since the new coalition government came to office, fears have emerged on exactly how the campaign-trail program would translate into the forthcoming budget – an answer to this question is expected on September 27.
The government’s stance so far has been to be fairly relaxed, especially on the 3% threshold (of budget deficit as % of GDP), which explains why the yield spread with Germany widened considerably over recent weeks.
This was a source of concern as the Italian economy would soon have run up against financing difficulties due to the reluctance of non-resident investors – who hold around 35% of the country’s debt – to revisit the Italian market after withdrawing their investment in the country all summer. Italians cannot and do not want to leave the euro area, so additional pressure on liquidity and interest rates could have hampered funding for Europe as a whole.
However, the economic situation is swiftly changing in Italy, as economic activity slowed sharply over the summer months, Continue reading
The whole document is available in pdf format September round-up of the summer_s events
Let’s start with the global outlook – are signs on the world economy still as robust as they were?
The situation has changed since the start of this year. The world economy was fuelled by faster world trade growth in 2017, but this is no longer the case. Trade momentum has slowed since the start of 2018 and no longer looks able to drive the same impetus across the economy as a whole.
Business surveys worldwide point to a slowdown in export orders, reflecting more sluggish momentum worldwide.
Why did we see an acceleration in 2017?
Central banks loosened monetary policy in 2016, at a time when inflation was low in most countries, bar a few exceptions such as Russia and Brazil. The Federal Reserve raised its leading rates at a very slow pace and steered its communication to ensure that investors were not spooked, especially in emerging economies.
More accommodative monetary policies kindled domestic demand in each country, spurring on economic activity and trade, and triggering broad-based momentum that was beneficial for all concerned and set the world economy on a virtuous trend.
What has changed since then?
I ran into an article by the usually excellent Joseph Stiglitz on secular stagnation, entitled “The Myth of Secular Stagnation.” They gist of the article appears to be that the idea of secular stagnation is some sort of a ploy to absolve policy makers from responsibility of the slow recovery from the Great Recession. I think this view is so fundamentally wrongheaded that it seems worthwhile waking this little blog up from the dead to offer a brief comment on this notion.
Click on the link to read Eggertsson’s article
The Q2 growth number for the second quarter was disappointing in France. It was just 0,158% (non annualized) which is rounded at 0,2%. It’s the same figure than in Q1 (0,153%).
Carryover growth is just 1.3% for 2018 at the end of the second quarter. The government growth target in the 2018 budget is 1.7%. This is attainable if growth is at 0.55% in Q3 and in Q4. We can’t imagine the reason of this stronger momentum during the second half of 2018.
Households consumption is the weakness of the French growth since the beginning of the year. Change in the purchasing power was negative in Q1 for fiscal reason (higher taxes) and was probably negative also in Q2 due to a higher inflation rate. Corporate investment was higher in Q2 (good news) after a very weak number in Q1.
For 2018 we can expect a growth figure close to 1.5% which will be way below the 2.3% seen in 2017.
This mean that the public deficit target at 2.3% of GDP will not be reached. It will remain close to its 2017 level at 2.6%.